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ESSAYS
APPLYING ANTITRUST LAW TO NCAA
REGULATION OF "BIG TIME" COLLEGE
ATHLETICS: THE NEED TO SHIFT FROM
NOSTALGIC 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY
IDEALS OF AMATEURISM TO THE
ECONOMIC REALITIES OF THE
21ST CENTURY*
MATrHEW J. MirhEN**
The original purpose of intercollegiate athletics was to provide an
extracurricular activity for talented students who attended college pri-
marily to earn an academic degree that would enable them to pursue a
career outside of professional athletics. According to the National Col-
legiate Athletic Association ("NCAA"), "[s]tudent-athletes shall be am-
ateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be
motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social
benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is
an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation
by professional and commercial enterprises."' Today, this concept of an
"amateur" athlete and the student-athlete model still applies for most
sports and most students, especially women's sports and men's non-reve-
nue sports.2
* Presented on January 8, 1999, as part of the Law and Sports Section of the Association
of American Law Schools symposium titled The NCAA's Evolving Role in Governing
Intercollegiate Athletics.
** Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute, Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHmsc AssOCIATION, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MAN-
UAL, art. 2.9 (2000-01) (hereinafter MANuAL). However, as Dean Rodney Smith observed in
his presentation, commercial sponsorship of college athletic events has been present since the
mid-1800s.
2. Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25
RUrGERS L. REv. 269 (1994).
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Not all NCAA sponsored sports fit neatly within this amateur model.
Athletes participating in NCAA Division I football and basketball often
are more interested in developing their skills in hope of a future profes-
sional playing career than in earning a college degree. In fact, universi-
ties sponsoring "big-time" football and basketball programs effectively
serve as a farm system for the National Football League and National
Basketball Association by providing the training environment and play-
ing field for talented football and basketball players to hone their physi-
cal talents.
The tremendous public popularity of men's college football and bas-
ketball creates a substantial revenue-generating capacity and the pros-
pect of increased visibility for universities. The significant economic
rewards of winning have generated fierce off-field competition among
universities for inputs necessary to produce winning teams (e.g., coaches
and players) as well as efforts to fully exploit the economic value of their
athletic products by maximizing fan and booster support, television reve-
nues, and commercial sponsorships. The economic realities of this envi-
ronment contrast sharply with the nostalgic ideal of the college amateur
athlete whose participation in a sport is merely incidental to a univer-
sity's provision of higher education in an academic environment.
The NCAA's basic regulatory objective is "to maintain intercollegi-
ate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the ath-
lete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and profes-
sional sports."4 In other words, the NCAA seeks to: 1) preserve the ama-
teur nature of college sports; 2) as a component part of higher education;
and 3) to ensure competitive balance on the playing field. Although
these are laudable objectives, they are quite difficult to achieve given the
economic reality of "big-time" college athletics, namely an existing "ath-
letics arms race" fueled by the multi-million dollar economic rewards of
winning teams fielded by members operating "big time" programs.5
The NCAA effectively determines the permissible nature and scope
of virtually all aspects of both on-field and off-field competition among
its members. It appears to function as an economic cartel in its regula-
tion of Division I football and basketball programs. The NCAA's mem-
3. See generally, MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INc.: THE ATrLEnc DEPARTMENT
vs. THE UNIVERSrrY (1990); MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO VIcroRy: THE CRisES THAT
SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS (1998).
4. MANUAL, art. 1.3.1.
5. John C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find A Place In Commercialized College Sports?,
3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 211-12 (1995).
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ber schools are economic competitors that collectively possess
monopsony power over the demand for college football and basketball
players and monopoly power over the supply of college football and bas-
ketball games. They frequently agree to limit (or prohibit) free market
forces from determining input prices for players, output of games, and
other aspects of economic competition among themselves. The NCAA
polices and enforces its rules and agreements by disciplining violators.
Although individual NCAA members have an incentive to gain a com-
petitive advantage by not complying with the association's rules, there is
an economic necessity to remain a part of this national organization to
reap the economic rewards of "big-time" college sports.
Given the economic realities of "big-time" college athletics, many
NCAA rules limiting economic competition among universities appear
to violate the federal antitrust laws. However, although there have been
several antitrust suits challenging the legality of NCAA imposed re-
straints affecting Division I football and basketball, most litigation has
been unsuccessful. In analyzing judicial treatment of the NCAA and its
rules for antitrust purposes, it is important to look at the historical evolu-
tion of antitrust jurisprudence concerning intercollegiate athletics.
Courts initially held that NCAA rule-making, regulatory, or enforce-
ment activities do not sufficiently impact interstate trade or commerce to
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction.6 NCAA rules designed to promote
amateurism and protect academic integrity were deemed to constitute
regulation of noncommercial activity that does not trigger antitrust scru-
tiny. Beginning in the mid-1970s, courts began recognizing that the pro-
vision and regulation of "big-time" intercollegiate athletics is business
activity subject to the Sherman Act, but were reluctant to find that
NCAA regulations violated the antitrust laws.7
In 1984, in NCAA v. Board of Regents,8 the Supreme Court held that
the NCAA does not have a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws,
although it is a nonprofit entity with educational objectives, because the
"NCAA and its member institutions are in fact organized to maximize
revenues." 9 The Court invalidated NCAA restrictions on its members'
6. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295,303 (D. Mass. 1975); College Ath. Placement Serv. v.
NCAA, No. CIV. A. 74-1144, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7050, at *10 (D. N.J. Aug. 22, 1974),
affd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
7. Association of Intercollegiate Ath. for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977).
8. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
9. Id. at 101. The two dissenting justices criticized the Court's majority for "treating inter-
collegiate athletics under the NCAA's control as a purely commercial venture in which col-
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sale of television rights to football games that prevented economic com-
petition among them. However, the Court acknowledged the NCAA's
role "as the guardian of an important American tradition" and its "his-
toric role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate ama-
teur athletics." 10 The Court's majority strongly suggested that primarily
noncommercial NCAA rules to preserve amateurism, academic integ-
rity, and competitive balance do not violate the antitrust laws."
After Board of Regents, courts generally have rejected antitrust chal-
lenges to NCAA rules by providing great deference and discretion to the
NCAA. These courts have assumed that NCAA rules are ancillary non-
commercial restraints necessary to produce intercollegiate athletics and/
or to further legitimate higher education objectives. Courts appear eager
to find that NCAA regulation that does not directly fix prices for inputs
(e.g., coaches' salaries)' a or the sale of output (e.g., television rights)' 3 is
either: 1) characterized as noncommercial and not subject to antitrust
challenge 4 ; 2) not found to have significant anticompetitive effects 5 ; or
3) assumed to be procompetitive by being the least restrictive means of
furthering the NCAA's stated objectives (which are usually judicially
deemed to be legitimate).' 6
On the one hand, courts have held that agreements among NCAA
member schools that directly fix prices in input or output markets for
college sports are illegal. The Board of Regents Court ruled that the
NCAA's exclusive football television rights plan violates the antitrust
laws because it effectively establishes a set price for televised football
games without any offsetting procompetitive justification, such as pre-
serving competitive balance or the integrity of intercollegiate athletics.
Consistent with Board of Regents, in Law v. NCAA, the Tenth Circuit
recently held that an NCAA imposed cap of $16,000.00 on Division I
leges and universities participate solely, or even primarily, in the pursuit of profits" because of
the "essentially noneconomic nature of the NCAA's program of self-regulation." Id. at 121,
133.
10. Id. at 101 n.23.
11. Id. at 101-02.
12. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
13. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
14. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), affjd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 982
(1999); Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 193 F.R.D. 693 (D. Kan. 2000); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F.
Supp. 2d 460 (D. N.J. 1998); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
15. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F. 2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
16. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conf., 101
F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming validity of conference sanctions imposed on member uni-
versity for violation of amateurism rules because no proof this procompetitive objective can
be achieved in substantially less restrictive manner).
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entry-level basketball coaches' salaries is an unreasonable restraint of
trade as a matter of law. 7 Applying the truncated or "quick look" rule
of reason, the court found this salary cap has the naked anticompetitive
effect of fixing one of the costs of producing Division I basketball games
without furthering product availability or competitive balance among
NCAA members in the least restrictive manner.!'
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have uniformly upheld
NCAA eligibility standards that athletes must satisfy to participate in
intercollegiate athletics. Athlete eligibility requirements promulgated by
the NCAA appear to be virtually per se legal under the antitrust laws.
Courts have rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA regulations designed
to preserve the amateur nature of college sports, such as the "no draft"
and "no agent" rules' 9 and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on
institutions for violation of the NCAA's amateurism rules.2 °
In Smith v. NCAA, 2' the Third Circuit ruled that an NCAA eligibility
rule prohibiting a student from participating in intercollegiate sports
while enrolled in a graduate program at an institution other than where
she earned her undergraduate degree does not violate the antitrust
laws.2' The court distinguished Law because the challenged rule is not "a
restriction on [any] business activities of [NCAA] institutions."' Moreo-
ver, Law observed that "courts should afford the NCAA plenty of room
under the antitrust laws to preserve the amateur character of intercolle-
giate athletics. 24
Adidas' recent antitrust challenge to NCAA restrictions on its mem-
bers' sale of promotional rights to sponsors illustrates judicial unwilling-
ness to acknowledge that universities engage in economic competition
among themselves off the playing field and that some NCAA rules may
restrain trade. In Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA,2 5 Adidas alleged that
NCAA limits on the size of manufacturer logos on uniforms and playing
equipment unreasonably restrained competition among NCAA member
institutions for the sale of advertising rights.26 The court initially denied
Adidas' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of this
17. Law, 134 F.3d at 1010.
18. Id. at 1016-19.
19. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089, 1091; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746.
20. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345-46; Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318-20.
21. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 184-87.
23. Id. at 186.
24. 134 F.3d at 1022 n.14.
25. 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
26. Id. at 1100.
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rule.27 Observing that Law provides no guidance regarding the line be-
tween commercial and noncommercial activities, the court characterized
the subject NCAA regulation as noncommercial because it does not
have the purpose or effect of giving NCAA members a direct economic
benefit.28 Rather, it found the rule furthered the NCAA's legitimate ob-
jective of preventing the commercialization of college sports, notwith-
standing that patches identifying football bowl game sponsors on player
uniforms are not subject to the size limits of this rule (not to mention
that athletes may be required to wear a particular manufacturer's shoes
as part of a sponsorship agreement with an NCAA university).29
Subsequently, the court granted the NCAA's motion to dismiss
Adidas' complaint."0 The court found that Adidas failed to properly al-
lege a relevant market in which competition is adversely affected by the
challenged NCAA rule.3' Adidas only asserted a reduction in competi-
tion in the market for the sale of advertising rights on uniforms worn by
players at NCAA institutions.3 2 However, the court ruled that the appro-
priate relevant market "includes all advertising vehicles that are reason-
ably interchangeable with NCAA promotional rights on athletic
apparel, 3 such as uniforms worn by players for professional and
Olympic sports teams. In other words, the court concluded that the
NCAA's rule restricting the size of manufacturer logos on uniforms has
no significant anticompetitive effect as a matter of law.
The Adidas trial court's disposition of the case is another example of
unwarranted judicial deference to NCAA regulation of economic com-
petition among its member institutions. The Adidas holding is inconsis-
tent with the Board of Regents and Law precedent establishing a
framework of antitrust analysis for NCAA regulatory activity with a
commercial impact. Adidas' allegations, at the very least, raise a factual
issue for discovery regarding the anticompetitive effects of this NCAA
rule. If the limitation on logo size has the effect of reducing economic
competition among NCAA members, the NCAA must prove that it fur-
thers a valid procompetitive objective that cannot be accomplished by a
substantially less restrictive means.
27. Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1287 (D. Kan. 1999).
28. Id. at 1296.
29. Id.
30. Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999).
31. Id. at 1104.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1102.
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There is no valid justification for permitting the NCAA to determine
arbitrarily the permissible degree of economic competition among its
members or, in light of these universities significant economic self-inter-
est, for courts to defer to the NCAA's judgment. Courts should abandon
anachronistic precedent based on unrealistic ideals of the "amateur" na-
ture of "big-time" college athletics and develop a principled antitrust ju-
risprudence more consistent with the economic realities of college sports
in the 21st century.
I am not advocating that all NCAA regulation of competition vio-
lates the antitrust laws. However, courts should not continue to make
unrealistic or unwarranted assumptions about the economic effects of
NCAA rules reducing or eliminating competition among its approxi-
mately 1,100 member schools. NCAA regulation that has anticompeti-
tive, intrabrand effects should be proven to be the least restrictive means
of promoting interbrand competition as a matter of fact, rather than be-
ing presumed to do so as a matter of law.

